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Korean War 2? Tiger Tails and Black Swans
What is the probability of North Korea initiating a second Korean war?
朝鲜再发动一场朝鲜战争的概率有多大?
Most analysts believe the chances of such a doomsday scenario are minimal. The main reasoning: North Korea’s regime isn’t suicidal and such an act would almost certainly bring about its own end.
大多数分析人士认为，出现这样一种末日局面的可能性非常小。主要的理由是：朝鲜政权并不想自杀，而再发动一场朝鲜战争则几乎肯定会令朝鲜政权灭亡。
But what if future events on the Korean peninsula deviate from what outside observers view as “rational” behavior?
但如果朝鲜半岛未来的活动偏离了外部观察人士所认为的“理性”行为，又会怎样呢?
Firstly, consider North Korea’s callow commander-in-chief, thought to be 30 or thereabouts. Military leaders essentially two generations older than Kim Jong Eun are now taking orders from a leader with little first-hand military experience. In the U.S., this wouldn’t happen: the constitution specifically forbids any commander-in-chief younger than 35.
首先，想想朝鲜这位乳臭未干的三军总司令吧(据信他今年大概有30岁)。和金正恩(Kim Jong Eun)祖父同辈的军事领导人目前需要听从一位几乎毫无第一手军事经验的领导人的号令。在美国，这样的事是不会发生的：美国宪法明确禁止年龄在35岁以下的人担任三军总司令。
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But in North Korea we now have an awkward and perhaps dangerous dynamic because of Korean culture’s strict neo-Confucian age hierarchy, which dictates that those giving orders should be older than those receiving them.
但在朝鲜，由于文化中严格的新儒家长幼观念(这种观念认为，发号施令者的年纪应该比接受命令的人要大)，目前的情形很棘手，或许还很危险。
And what about those orders? Some have latched on to Mr. Kim’s several years studying in Switzerland and his young age to speculate that he is more open to changing the Stalinist state and perhaps less likely to initiate confrontation.
那么朝鲜领导人发布的命令该当如何呢?由于金正恩曾在瑞士求学多年，年纪又轻，一些人进而猜测他对改革朝鲜这个斯大林式国家持更加开放的态度，或许不太可能引发对外冲突。
In striking irony, it could be that the opposite may be true. Maybe it is precisely because of his years spent outside the closed borders of North Korea and his youth that he is compelled to overcompensate in the form of hyper-hawkish brinksmanship. Viewed from the outside, such acts can appear unpredictable and irrational. But viewed from the inside, it could signal an attempt to score much-needed loyalty and patriot points at home.
然而颇为讽刺的是，事实可能恰恰相反。也许正是因为他在朝鲜封闭的国境之外生活了几年，以及他年纪太轻，他才不得不推行超级强硬的边缘政策进行过度补偿。从外部来看，这样的行为可能显得不可预测又缺乏理性。但是从内部来看，这可能代表着为赢得急需的忠诚和爱国主义分数所进行的一次尝试。
Then there are the seemingly daily displays of tit-for-tat military might on both sides of the demilitarized zone. Viewed from a soldier’s mindset along the DMZ, driven by fear as much as rationality amid current tensions, it becomes more likely that even minor maneuvers or accidents such as weaponry misfiring will be interpreted as provocations. Such an interpretation would necessitate a counter-response, which could then escalate into a wider conflict.
正因如此，双方似乎每天都会在非军事区进行以牙还牙的军力展示。从非军事区的一名战士的角度来看，由于恐惧对人的影响可能抵消对目前紧张局势的理性判断，即使是微小的部队调动或是武器走火的意外事件都更有可能被解读成挑衅行为。这样的解读将使“反响应”成为必要，而反响应可能会升级为更大范围的冲突。
Given all such changing variables, a distinct possibility exists of a hidden “black swan” event—known as a “tail risk” in financial circles—in which an extremely low probability, unexpected event suddenly materializes to wreak havoc in the form of potential human collateral damage and mass panic in the financial markets.
考虑到所有这些不断变化的可变因素，发生黑天鹅事件的可能性明显存在。黑天鹅事件在金融界被称为“尾部风险”，指概率极低、极难预测的事件突然发生，以连锁反应和金融市场大规模恐慌的形式引发严重破坏。
So is it not worth considering and preparing for a potential hidden black swan and crouching tiger tail event? Or should we still hold on to the belief that all actors—including every soldier on both sides of the Korean border–exist in a perpetual state of rational behavior?
那么，是否有必要为潜在的看不见的黑天鹅进行计划和准备?或者，我们是否应该继续坚持我们的信念，即所有参与者，包括朝韩边境的每一个士兵都长期处在理性状态之下?
After all, if one bullet in Europe could trigger World War I, a chance could also exist that a black swan event could trigger the next inter-Korean conflict in Asia.
毕竟，如果欧洲的一颗子弹能够引发第一次世界大战，黑天鹅事件就有可能在亚洲引发下一次朝鲜战争。 |
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发表于 2016-7-11 09:57:29