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双语时事:评估奥巴马的经济政策

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发表于 2016-7-11 09:55:26 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
  How badly has the US economy performed under PresidentBarack Obama? Ronald Reagan posed the political version of thisquestion in his presidential debate against Jimmy Carter in 1980, when he asked: “Are you better off than you were four yearsago?” It is, naturally, the question Mitt Romney asks now.
          在巴拉克 奥巴马(Barack Obama)总统的领导下美国经济状况有多糟糕?1980年罗纳德 里根(Ronald Reagan)在与吉米 卡特(Jimmy Carter)的总统大选辩论中,问过这个问题的政治版:“比起四年前你的日子更好过了吗?”米特 罗姆尼(Mitt Romney)现在自然而然地问到了这个问题。
          At first glance, the answer is: just a little better off. In the second quarter of 2012, real grossdomestic product was 5.2 per cent higher than in the fourth quarter of 2008, the last full quarterbefore Mr Obama took office. The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of 7.8 per cent inSeptember was the same as in January 2009. Yet, since he took office when the economy was inthe throes of a huge financial crisis, analysts must ask whether this performance is decent in thecircumstances, as supporters argue, or disappointing, as opponents insist.
          对这个问题的答案第一反应是:只好过了一点。2012年第二季度美国实际国内生产总值(GDP)比奥巴马上任前的2008年第四季度高5.2%。9月经季节性调整后的失业率为7.8%,与2009年1月持平。然而奥巴马走马上任之际正逢美国经济处于一场巨大的金融危机带来的剧痛中,分析师必然会问,这样的经济表现在这一前提下是像支持者声称的那样令人满意,还是像反对者坚持的那样令人失望?
          John Taylor, professor at Stanford University, a highly regarded macroeconomist, has no doubtof the answer. In a recent blog, he argues that strong growth normally follows US financial crises, the exception to this rule being the current recovery (see chart). Moreover, he argues, bad policyis to blame. True, Prof Taylor is a member of Mr Romney’s economic team. Yet the questionremains: is he right? The answer is: no. But it is important to ask why.
          备受尊敬的宏观经济学家、斯坦福大学(Standford University)教授约翰 泰勒(John Taylor)对这一问题的答案毫不怀疑。在最近的博文中,他声称美国金融危机之后通常会伴随强劲增长,然而本轮经济复苏却是例外(参见图表)。另外,他还声称这一结果是由错误的政策导致的。没错,泰勒教授是罗姆尼经济团队的成员。但是问题在于:他说的对么?答案是“不对”。对此,有必要问一句他为什么不对。
          The first question is whether Prof Taylor is comparing like with like. Against him is widespreadagreement that the aftermaths of systemic financial crises are worse than those of more normaldownturns. The seminal research of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their classic book, This Time is Different, has shaped this consensus. It is also supported by the work of the economichistorian Alan Taylor, of the University of Virginia, included in a recent paper entitled The GreatLeveraging.
          第一个问题是泰勒教授所作的是否是同类比较。与泰勒的看法正相反,许多人都认为,系统性金融危机造成的余波比正常的经济下滑造成的影响恶劣得多。卡门 莱因哈特(Carmen Reinhart)和肯尼斯 罗格夫(Kenneth Rogoff)具有重要影响的研究结果促成了这种共识,这一研究成果可见于他们的经典著作《这次不一样》(This Time is Different)。经济史学家、弗吉尼亚大学(University of Virginia)的艾伦 泰勒(Alan Taylor)的研究成果也支持这一看法,该成果发表在最近一篇题为《巨大的杠杆》(The Great Leveraging)的论文中。
          Profs Reinhart and Rogoff distinguish a “systemic financial crisis” as one characterised by a realestate bubble and high levels of debt. Neither of these preceded the recessions of 1973 and 1981, which are included in Prof Taylor’s chart. Both the precursors and results of the recent crisis werequite different from the downturns in the mid-1970s, early 1980s and early 1990s. This is true ofreal house prices, inflation, interest rates and debt (see chart).
          莱因哈特教授和罗格夫教授以房地产泡沫和高债务率为特征辨别“系统性金融危机”。在1973年以及1981年衰退之前,这两者都没出现,而这两次衰退却都包括在泰勒教授的图中。与上世纪70年代中期、80年代早期以及90年代早期的经济低迷相比,最近这次危机的先兆和后果都大不相同。以实际房价、通胀率、利率和债务来看,情况的确如此(参见图表)。
          The second question is whether speed of recovery is a good measure of success. The answer is: no. To understand this, focus on the systemic financial crises that began in 1893, 1907, 1929 and 2007, respectively. In his chart, Prof Taylor relies on a paper by Michael Bordo of Rutgers andJoseph Haubrich of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. My chart uses their data, in whichrecoveries have the same duration as prior contractions. What marks out the recent recession isnot the weakness of the recovery, but that of the contraction. The main reason the recoveryseems weak was that the contraction was so mild, given the scale of the financial crisis. That was ahuge policy success.
          第二个问题是复苏的速度是不是一个很好的衡量经济政策是否成功的指标。答案是“否”。要理解这一点,需要关注一下分别始于1893年、1907年、1929年和2007年的系统性金融危机。泰勒教授在他的图中采信了由罗格斯大学(Rutgers)的麦克 博尔多(Michael Bordo)与克利夫兰联邦储备银行(Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)的约瑟夫 豪布里希(Joseph Haubrich)合写的一篇论文。我的图中也使用了他们的数据,他们的数据表明,这几次危机中复苏所需的时间与之前的收缩期一样长。而这次衰退与众不同之处不在于复苏势头有多弱,而在于收缩势头有多弱。考虑到这次金融危机的强度,正是由于收缩过程如此温和,而导致复苏势头看起来显得较弱。这实际上是政策的巨大成功之处。
          In their response to Prof Bordo and Mr Haubrich, Profs Reinhart and Rogoff also note that theeconomic contraction after the recent crisis was smaller than after prior systemic crises. Moreover, five years on, real GDP per head, relative to the baseline, is higher than in the average of priorsystemic crises. That is what matters. A stronger recovery from a steeper plunge is hardly a betteroutcome than a slower recovery from a milder plunge.
          针对博尔多与豪布里希的论文,莱因哈特与罗格夫也指出,比起之前的系统性危机,最近这轮危机之后的经济收缩幅度更小。此外,危机五年后,以基期价格计算的实际人均GDP较之前几次系统性危机的平均数据为高。以上事实才是关键。深度探底之后的强劲复苏并不比温和下滑后的缓慢复苏更好。
          The third question is whether it makes sense to focus on US experience alone. Prof Bordo hascomplained that Profs Reinhart and Rogoff lump together countries “with diverse institutions, financial structures and economic policies”. But it beggars belief that the US of the late 19th orearly 20th centuries, with the gold standard, no deposit insurance, no central bank before 1913 and minimal federal spending is more similar to today’s US than Japan or Sweden in the 1990s orSpain and the UK today. Profs Reinhart and Rogoff are surely right to reject this appeal toAmerican exceptionalism. Beyond that, limiting the analysis to US experience also limits the range ofcomparisons, thereby forcing the researchers to include many US recessions that are of borderlinerelevance, at best, to the needed focus on systemic crises.
          第三个问题是只关注美国的经验有没有意义?博尔多教授抱怨说,莱因哈特教授与罗格夫教授将“具有不同制度、金融结构以及经济政策”的国家放在一起比较。但实际上,19世纪末或20世纪初的美国采用金本位,没有存款保险,直到1913年前都没有央行,联邦政府开支也非常小,比起上世纪90年代的日本或瑞典,或者今天的西班牙以及英国,认为这样的美国与今天的美国更相似是令人难以置信的。莱因哈特和罗格夫反对这种美国例外论当然没错。此外,将分析限于美国经验也会限制比较的范围,促使研究人员为了研究系统性危机而将许多至多只能算是沾点边的美国衰退案例加入考察的范围。
          The international comparisons made by Profs Reinhart and Rogoff turn out to be quite revealing. The performance of the US in this crisis has been markedly better than the average of the otherhigh income countries that were hit by the recent wave of systemic banking crises (see chart). Again, the analysis supports the view that systemic financial crises do cause deeper and longer-lasting recessions. Using a database of more than 200 recessions over 140 years in 14 high-incomecountries, Prof Taylor argues that the combination of a credit boom with a financial crisis imposes “abnormally severe downward pressures on growth, prices and capital formation for sustainedperiods”.
          由莱因哈特教授与罗格夫教授所作的国与国间的比较非常有启发性。相对其他受到最近这波系统性银行业危机冲击的高收入国家,美国在此次危机中的表现比它们的平均表现明显要好得多(参照图表)。而且,这一分析也支持系统性金融危机确实会造成更严重、持续时间更长的衰退这一观点。利用一个包含14个高收入国家在140年间超过200次衰退案例的数据库,泰勒教授指出,信贷繁荣与金融危机共同作用,“给经济增长、物价以及资本形成”带来了“异常严重的长期下行压力”。
          In sum, we have no reason to regard the performance of the US economy under presidentObama as poor, given the conditions he inherited. But this does not mean that recovery could nothave been far stronger. Policy was insufficiently supportive of a stronger recovery. That is partlybecause the administration underestimated the forces for contraction. It is still more because of theopposition of the Republicans to any stimulus. In an economy afflicted by the implosion of a hugecredit boom, the forces for contraction were bound to be both strong and enduring. With interestrates at zero, the effectiveness of monetary policy was limited. Given this, the American Recoveryand Reinvestment Act, which amounted to an average of a little under 2 per cent of GDP in theyears it was effective, was plainly too small.
          综上所述,考虑到奥巴马总统接手的烂摊子,我们没有理由认为在他的领导下美国经济表现很糟糕。然而这也不意味着经济复苏无法更为强劲。目前政策不足以支持更强劲的复苏。部分原因是本届政府低估了收缩的强度。更大的原因是因为共和党人反对任何经济刺激措施。在巨大的信贷繁荣崩溃的冲击之下,经济收缩的力度注定是强劲而持久的。而货币政策的效果在利率为零的条件下非常有限。考虑到这一点,总金额平均仅占生效年GDP近2%的《美国复苏与再投资法案》(AmericanRecovery and Reinvestment Act)明显规模太小了。
          The great achievement of policy was to limit the severity of the post-crisis recession. This is largelydue to the Federal Reserve and the decision to prevent a financial collapse in the autumn of 2008. But it is also due to sensible, albeit limited, action by the administration. Moreover, by historical andinternational comparisons, the US economy has performed quite well. Focusing on the recovery, without looking at the contraction, is clearly misleading. Finally, to the extent that the recovery wasnot stronger, the obstructionism of Republicans in Congress has to bear a sizeable part of theblame. But the big question is: what comes next? Who has the policies to ensure a strong andsustained US recovery? I intend to examine that question next week.
          政策的巨大成就是限制了危机之后衰退的严重程度。这很大程度上得益于美联储(Federal Reserve)以及2008年秋阻止金融崩溃的决定。然而这也得益于本届政府尽管力度有限却不乏明智的措施。此外,不论纵向还是横向比较,美国经济的表现都算相当不错。只关注复苏,而不去考察收缩显然很有误导性。最后,对于此次经济复苏不够强劲的说法,国会中蓄意阻挠提案的共和党人也应该承担相当大的一部分责任。然而,现在最大的问题是:下一步会怎样?谁的政策能够保证美国经济强劲而持续地复苏?
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