赖斯接受9-11调查委员公开质询时发言全文

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　　Condoleezza Rice: Opening Statement U.S. Commission on Terrorist
Attacks
        　　delivered on 8 April 2004, Hart Senate Office Building
        　　I thank the Commission for arranging this special session. Thank you for
helping to find a way to meet the Nation"s need to learn all we can about the
September 11th attacks, while preserving important Constitutional
principles.
        　　This Commission, and those who appear before it, have a vital charge. We
owe it to those we lost, and to their loved ones, and to our country, to learn
all we can about that tragic day, and the events that led to it. Many families
of the victims are here today, and I thank them for their contributions to the
Commission"s work.
        　　The terrorist threat to our Nation did not emerge on September 11th, 2001.
Long before that day, radical, freedom-hating terrorists declared war on America
and on the civilized world. The attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in
1983, the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985, the rise of al-Qaida and the
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the attacks on American installations
in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, the East Africa embassy bombings of 1998, the
attack on the USS Cole in 2000, these and other atrocities were part of a
sustained, systematic campaign to spread devastation and chaos and to murder
innocent Americans.
        　　The terrorists were at war with us, but we were not yet at war with them.
For more than 20 years, the terrorist threat gathered, and America"s response
across several administrations of both parties was insufficient. Historically,
democratic societies have been slow to react to gathering threats, tending
instead to wait to confront threats until they are too dangerous to ignore or
until it is too late. Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued
German harassment of American shipping, the United States did not enter the
First World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany"s repeated
violations of the Versailles Treaty and its string of provocations throughout
the mid-1930s, the Western democracies did not take action until 1939. The U.S.
Government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan until the
threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for all the
language of war spoken before September 11th, this country simply was not on a
war footing.
        　　Since then, America has been at war. And under President Bush"s leadership,
we will remain at war until the terrorist threat to our Nation is ended. The
world has changed so much that it is hard to remember what our lives were like
before that day. But I do want to describe the actions this Administration was
taking to fight terrorism before September 11th, 2001.
        　　After President Bush was elected, we were briefed by the Clinton
Administration on many national security issues during the transition. The
President-elect and I were briefed by George Tenet on terrorism and on the
al-Qaida network. Members of Sandy Berger"s NSC staff briefed me, along with
other members of the new national security team, on counterterrorism and
al-Qaida. This briefing lasted about one hour, and it reviewed the Clinton
Administration"s counterterrorism approach and the various counterterrorism
activities then underway. Sandy and I personally discussed a variety of other
topics, including North Korea, Iraq, the Middle East, and the Balkans.
        　　Because of these briefings and because we had watched the rise of al-Qaida
over the years, we understood that the network posed a serious threat to the
United States. We wanted to ensure there was no respite in the fight against
al-Qaida. On an operational level, we decided immediately to continue pursuing
the Clinton Administration"s covert action authorities and other efforts to
fight the network. President Bush retained George Tenet as Director of Central
Intelligence, and Louis Freeh remained the Director of the FBI. I took the
unusual step of retaining Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton Administration"s
counterterrorism team on the NSC staff. I knew Dick to be an expert in his
field, as well as an experienced crisis manager. Our goal was to ensure
continuity of operations while we developed new and more aggressive
policies.
        　　At the beginning of the Administration, President Bush revived the practice
of meeting with the Director of Central Intelligence almost every day in the
Oval Office -? meetings which I attended, along with the Vice President and the
Chief of Staff. At these meetings, the President received up-to-date
intelligence and asked questions of his most senior intelligence officials. From
January 20 through September 10, the President received at these daily meetings
more than 40 briefing items on al-Qaida, and 13 of these were in response to
questions he or his top advisers had posed. In addition to seeing DCI Tenet
almost every morning, I generally spoke by telephone every morning at 7:15 with
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld. I also met and spoke regularly with the DCI
about al-Qaida and terrorism.
        　　Of course, we also had other responsibilities. President Bush had set a
broad foreign policy agenda. We were determined to confront the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. We were improving America"s relations with the
world"s great powers. We had to change an Iraq policy that was making no
progress against a hostile regime which regularly shot at U.S. planes enforcing
U.N. Security Council Resolutions. And we had to deal with the occasional
crisis, for instance, when the crew of a Navy plane was detained in China for 11
days.
        　　We also moved to develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the
al-Qaida terrorist network. President Bush understood the threat, and he
understood its importance. He made clear to us that he did not want to respond
to al-Qaida one attack at a time. He told me he was "tired of swatting
flies."
        　　This new strategy was developed over the Spring and Summer of 2001, and was
approved by the President"s senior national security officials on September 4.
It was the very first major national security policy directive of the Bush
Administration -? not Russia, not missile defense, not Iraq, but the elimination
of al-Qaida.
        　　Although this National Security Presidential Directive was originally a
highly classified document, we arranged for portions to be declassified to help
the Commission in its work, and I will describe some of those today. The
strategy set as its goal the elimination of the al-Qaida network. It ordered the
leadership of relevant U.S. departments and agencies to make the elimination of
al-Qaida a high priority and to use all aspects of our national power -?
intelligence, financial, diplomatic, and military ?- to meet this goal. And it
gave Cabinet Secretaries and department heads specific responsibilities. For
instance:
        　　* It directed the Secretary of State to work with other countries to end
all sanctuaries given to al-Qaida.
        　　* It directed the Secretaries of the Treasury and State to work with
foreign governments to seize or freeze assets and holdings of al-Qaida and its
benefactors.
        　　* It directed the Director of Central Intelligence to prepare an aggressive
program of covert activities to disrupt al-Qaida and provide assistance to
anti-Taliban groups operating against al-Qaida in Afghanistan.
        　　* It tasked the Director of OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds were
available in the budgets over the next five years to meet the goals laid out in
the strategy.
        　　* And it directed the Secretary of Defense to -? and I quote ?- "ensure
that the contingency planning process include plans: against al-Qaida and
associated terrorist facilities in Afghanistan, including leadership,
command-control-communications, training, and logistics facilities; against
Taliban targets in Afghanistan, including leadership, command-control, air and
air defense, ground forces, and logistics; to eliminate weapons of mass
destruction which al-Qaida and associated terrorist groups may acquire or
manufacture, including those stored in underground bunkers." This was a change
from the prior strategy -- Presidential Decision Directive 62, signed in 1998 -?
which ordered the Secretary of Defense to provide transportation to bring
individual terrorists to the U.S. for trial, to protect DOD forces overseas, and
to be prepared to respond to terrorist and weapons of mass destruction
incidents.
        　　More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could
succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy
documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism
strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the
complexities of the region.
        　　Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most
difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right.
Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was
supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful
umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.
        　　Not that we hadn"t tried. Within a month of taking office, President Bush
sent a strong, private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his
influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down
al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis,
including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with
Pakistan"s Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very
tough message, which was met with a rote, expressionless response.
        　　America"s al-Qaida policy wasn"t working because our Afghanistan policy
wasn"t working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn"t working because our Pakistan
policy wasn"t working. We recognized that America"s counterterrorism policy had
to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign
policy.
        　　To address these problems, I made sure to involve key regional experts. I
brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat
in the 1980s, had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to
turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC
experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and his regional
specialists. Together, we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan.
Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the
importance of the south -? the social and political heartland of the country.
Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade
Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our
approach to India, to preserve stability on the subcontinent.
        　　While we were developing this new strategy to deal with al-Qaida, we also
made decisions on a number of specific anti-al-Qaida initiatives that had been
proposed by Dick Clarke. Many of these ideas had been deferred by the last
Administration, and some had been on the table since 1998. We increased
counterterror assistance to Uzbekistan; we bolstered the Treasury Department"s
activities to track and seize terrorist assets; we increased funding for
counterterrorism activities across several agencies; and we moved quickly to arm
Predator unmanned surveillance vehicles for action against al-Qaida.
        　　When threat reporting increased during the Spring and Summer of 2001, we
moved the U.S. Government at all levels to a high state of alert and activity.
Let me clear up any confusion about the relationship between the development of
our new strategy and the many actions we took to respond to threats that summer.
Policy development and crisis management require different approaches.
Throughout this period, we did both simultaneously.
        　　For the essential crisis management task, we depended on the
Counterterrorism Security Group chaired by Dick Clarke to be the interagency
nerve center. The CSG consisted of senior counterterrorism experts from CIA, the
FBI, the Department of Justice, the Defense Department (including the Joint
Chiefs), the State Department, and the Secret Service. The CSG had met regularly
for many years, and its members had worked through numerous periods of
heightened threat activity. As threat information increased, the CSG met more
frequently, sometimes daily, to review and analyze the threat reporting and to
coordinate actions in response. CSG members also had ready access to their
Cabinet Secretaries and could raise any concerns they had at the highest
levels.
            
            

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        　　The threat reporting that we received in the Spring and Summer of 2001 was
not specific as to time, nor place, nor manner of attack. Almost all of the
reports focused on al-Qaida activities outside the United States, especially in
the Middle East and North Africa. In fact, the information that was specific
enough to be actionable referred to terrorist operations overseas. More often,
it was frustratingly vague. Let me read you some of the actual chatter that we
picked up that Spring and Summer:
        　　* "Unbelievable news in coming weeks" * "Big event ... there will be a
very, very, very, very big uproar" * "There will be attacks in the near
future"
        　　Troubling, yes. But they don"t tell us when; they don"t tell us where; they
don"t tell us who; and they don"t tell us how.
        　　In this context, I want to address in some detail one of the briefing items
we received, since its content has frequently been mischaracterized. On August
6, 2001, the President"s intelligence briefing included a response to questions
he had earlier raised about any al-Qaida intentions to strike our homeland. The
briefing item reviewed past intelligence reporting, mostly dating from the
1990s, regarding possible al-Qaida plans to attack inside the United States. It
referred to uncorroborated reporting from 1998 that terrorists might attempt to
hijack a U.S. aircraft in an attempt to blackmail the government into releasing
U.S.-held terrorists who had participated in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing. This briefing item was not prompted by any specific threat information.
And it did not raise the possibility that terrorists might use airplanes as
missiles.
        　　Despite the fact that the vast majority of the threat information we
received was focused overseas, I was also concerned about possible threats
inside the United States. On July 5, Chief of Staff Andy Card and I met with
Dick Clarke, and I asked Dick to make sure that domestic agencies were aware of
the heightened threat period and were taking appropriate steps to respond, even
though we did not have specific threats to the homeland. Later that same day,
Clarke convened a special meeting of his CSG, as well as representatives from
the FAA, the INS, Customs, and the Coast Guard. At that meeting, these agencies
were asked to take additional measures to increase security and
surveillance.
        　　Throughout this period of heightened threat information, we worked hard on
multiple fronts to detect, protect against, and disrupt any terrorist plans or
operations that might lead to an attack. For instance:
        　　* The Department of Defense issued at least five urgent warnings to U.S.
military forces that al-Qaida might be planning a near-term attack, and placed
our military forces in certain regions on heightened alert.
        　　* The State Department issued at least four urgent security advisories and
public worldwide cautions on terrorist threats, enhanced security measures at
certain embassies, and warned the Taliban that they would be held responsible
for any al-Qaida attack on U.S. interests.
        　　* The FBI issued at least three nationwide warnings to Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies, and specifically stated that, although the vast
majority of the information indicated overseas targets, attacks against the
homeland could not be ruled out. The FBI also tasked all 56 of its U.S. Field
Offices to increase surveillance of known or suspected terrorists and reach out
to known informants who might have information on terrorist activities.
        　　* The FAA issued at least five Civil Aviation Security Information
Circulars to all U.S. airlines and airport security personnel, including
specific warnings about the possibility of hijackings.
        　　* The CIA worked round the clock to disrupt threats worldwide. Agency
officials launched a wide-ranging disruption effort against al-Qaida in more
than 20 countries.
        　　* During this period, the Vice President, DCI Tenet, and the NSC"s
Counterterrorism staff called senior foreign officials requesting that they
increase their intelligence assistance and report to us any relevant threat
information.
        　　This is a brief sample of our intense activity over the Summer of 2001.
        　　Yet, as your hearings have shown, there was no silver bullet that could
have prevented the 9/11 attacks. In hindsight, if anything might have helped
stop 9/11, it would have been better information about threats inside the United
States, something made difficult by structural and legal impediments that
prevented the collection and sharing of information by our law enforcement and
intelligence agencies.
        　　So the attacks came. A band of vicious terrorists tried to decapitate our
government, destroy our financial system, and break the spirit of America. As an
officer of government on duty that day, I will never forget the sorrow and the
anger I felt. Nor will I forget the courage and resilience shown by the American
people and the leadership of the President that day.
        　　Now, we have an opportunity and an obligation to move forward together.
Bold and comprehensive changes are sometimes only possible in the wake of
catastrophic events -? events which create a new consensus that allows us to
transcend old ways of thinking and acting. Just as World War II led to a
fundamental reorganization of our national defense structure and to the creation
of the National Security Council, so has September 11th made possible sweeping
changes in the ways we protect our homeland.
        　　President Bush is leading the country during this time of crisis and
change. He has unified and streamlined our efforts to secure the American
Homeland by creating the Department of Homeland Security, established a new
center to integrate and analyze terrorist threat information, directed the
transformation of the FBI into an agency dedicated to fighting terror, broken
down the bureaucratic walls and legal barriers that prevented the sharing of
vital threat information between our domestic law enforcement and our foreign
intelligence agencies, and, working with the Congress, given officials new
tools, such as the USA PATRIOT Act, to find and stop terrorists. And he has done
all of this in a way that is consistent with protecting America"s cherished
civil liberties and with preserving our character as a free and open
society.
        　　But the President also recognizes that our work is far from complete. More
structural reform will likely be necessary. Our intelligence gathering and
analysis have improved dramatically in the last two years, but they must be
stronger still. The President and all of us in his Administration welcome new
ideas and fresh thinking. We are eager to do whatever is necessary to protect
the American people. And we look forward to receiving the recommendations of
this Commission.
        　　We are at war and our security as a nation depends on winning that war. We
must and we will do everything we can to harden terrorist targets within the
United States. Dedicated law enforcement and security professionals continue to
risk their lives every day to make us all safer, and we owe them a debt of
gratitude. And, let"s remember, those charged with protecting us from attack
have to succeed 100 percent of the time. To inflict devastation on a massive
scale, the terrorists only have to succeed once, and we know they are trying
every day.
        　　That is why we must address the source of the problem. We must stay on
offense, to find and defeat the terrorists wherever they live, hide, and plot
around the world. If we learned anything on September 11th, 2001, it is that we
cannot wait while dangers gather.
        　　After the September 11th attacks, our Nation faced hard choices. We could
fight a narrow war against al-Qaida and the Taliban or we could fight a broad
war against a global menace. We could seek a narrow victory or we could work for
a lasting peace and a better world. President Bush chose the bolder course.
        　　He recognizes that the War on Terror is a broad war. Under his leadership,
the United States and our allies are disrupting terrorist operations, cutting
off their funding, and hunting down terrorists one-by-one. Their world is
getting smaller. The terrorists have lost a home-base and training camps in
Afghanistan. The Governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia now pursue them with
energy and force.
        　　We are confronting the nexus between terror and weapons of mass
destruction. We are working to stop the spread of deadly weapons and prevent
then from getting into the hands of terrorists, seizing dangerous materials in
transit, where necessary. Because we acted in Iraq, Saddam Hussein will never
again use weapons of mass destruction against his people or his neighbors. And
we have convinced Libya to give up all its WMD-related programs and
materials.
        　　And as we attack the threat at its sources, we are also addressing its
roots. Thanks to the bravery and skill of our men and women in uniform, we
removed from power two of the world"s most brutal regimes -- sources of
violence, and fear, and instability in the region. Today, along with many
allies, we are helping the people of Iraq and Afghanistan to build free
societies. And we are working with the people of the Middle East to spread the
blessings of liberty and democracy as the alternatives to instability, hatred,
and terror. This work is hard and dangerous, yet it is worthy of our effort and
our sacrifice. The defeat of terror and the success of freedom in those nations
will serve the interests of our Nation and inspire hope and encourage reform
throughout the greater Middle East.
        　　In the aftermath of September 11th, those were the right choices for
America to make -- the only choices that can ensure the safety of our Nation in
the decades to come.
        　　Thank you. Now I am happy to answer your questions.